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BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND THE RESERVE
SYSTEM: REAPPRAISAL OF AN ANACHRONISM
The century that has elapsed since the inception of professional base-
ball in 1864 has seen American professional sports evolve from an
embryonic form of diversion into a leviathan industry of international
scope and influence. This phenomenal development did not transpire
in an economic vacuum; the flourishing of professional sports was an
integral part of a period of unprecedented economic and industrial
growth.
This same century also witnessed the first attempts by American
government to regulate the wild, often ruthless expansion of new indus-
tries. In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act1 designed to destroy
monopoly powers and combinations in restraint of trade operating in
interstate commerce. The Sherman Act involved the federal government
in antitrust enforcement, a matter previously under the common law
jurisdiction of the state courts.2 In 1914, the federal antitrust laws were
supplemented by the passage of the Clayton Act,3 providing, inter alia,
for a civil remedy in the form of treble damages, as well as injunctive
relief, for Sherman Act violations.4
In the early years of federal antitrust law, the athletics industry was
in its neophyte stage and consequently did not warrant the close
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
3. 15 U.S.C. S§ 12-15, 19-22, 27, 44 (1964); 29 U.S.C. H9 52, 53 (1964).
4. Generally, a civil cause of action for an alleged antitrust violation is constructed
from two components:
(1) The substantive violation, Sherman Act H9 1, 2; 15 U.S.C. 1, 2 (1964) which
provide in pertinent part:
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States...
is declared to be illegal ....
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
(2) The civil remedy, Clayton Act § 4; 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964):
Sec. 15. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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governmental scrutiny and regulation directed against the more highly
developed industries. It was in this favorable climate of tolerance toward
an innocuous leisure-oriented industry that the mold was forged which
would pattern the player-management relationship in organized baseball
for over four decades, and which continues to pattern it to this day.
This mold was the Supreme Court decision in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League5 exempting professional baseball from
regulation under the Sherman Act.
The province of this note includes an examination of the antitrust ex-
emption-its legal basis and effect upon player controls (specifically the
reserve rule), the legality of such controls absent the exemption, and
possible alternative means of player control should the exemption be
abolished. Space limitations foreclose the discussion of such other
exemption-related windfalls as restraints on team ownership and televis-
ing rights.
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RESERVE RULE
6
In 1875 the Boston Red Stockings captured the professional baseball
championship with a record of seventy-one victories against eight losses.
At the opposite extreme, the cellar-bound Brooklyn Atlantics were able
to salvage only two conquests in a season which saw them compile
forty-two defeats.7 At the root of this disparity of power among the
professional baseball teams was the player salary differential. Wealthy
clubs, situated in populous urban areas, could allocate more funds to
player salaries than their less affluent rivals, and were thereby able to
attract the better players. As these wealthy clubs consequently com-
piled vastly superior records, their gate receipts soared as those of the
poorer clubs concomitantly declined. Bidding among the well-endowed
clubs in the limited market for player services drove salaries beyond the
reach of their less fortunate counterparts. The result was such athletic
travesties as the 1875 championship "race" previously mentioned. 8
These dynastic wars for players' services also produced another, more
5. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6. Throughout this note, "reserve rule," "reserve clause," "reserve agreement," and
"reserve system" are used interchangeably. Arguably, the terms have slightly different
meanings but these distinctions in definition are not material to the discussion which
concerns this note.
7. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-22 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
HousE BAMBaLL REPROT].
8. See generally Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets
the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE LJ. 576 (1953).
[Vol. 12:859
BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
pernicious, result. As the quality of competition on the playing field
increasingly reflected the competition at the bargaining table, spectator
interest declined. A consistent winner attracts avid spectators and sup-
porters from all regions of the country. But a team that is perennially
dominant in a field of marginal competition reduces the entire sport to
a decadent parody. As the public grew weary of watching the pre-
dictable mismatches, even the better clubs found themselves playing
to empty stadiums. Diminished gate receipts plus astronomical player
salaries rendered it impossible for any club to show a profit, so that
the National League, organized from fifteen teams in 1876, had lost
eight of those teams to financial dissolution by 1879. 9
It was in this aura of impending death in 1879 that the surviving seven
teams of the National League met and secretly agreed to "reserve,"
free from economic competition, five players apiece for the approach-
ing season.'0 As it happened, this reserve agreement rescued baseball
from an early demise, for not only did the new rule reduce team oper-
ating expenses by depressing player salaries, it also produced the unfore-
seen felicitous result of balancing inter-club strength by restricting the
flow of superior players to the league moguls. The effect on the young
industry was immediate and dramatic; the financial outlook of the Na-
tional League improved steadily from the year 1881, so that by 1890 the
future of professional baseball appeared secure."
The reserve rule, while achieving the desired result of averting im-
minent financial ruin, soon became the most repressive form of control
over a skilled labor market in American industry. By 1883, an agreement
between the National League and its now-defunct rival, the American
Association, permitted each club to reserve nine players, and imposed
sanctions on a club which "tampered" with another club's reserved
players.' 2 Finally, the reserve rule was incorporated, with a provision
for assignability, into a uniform player's contract, rendering the organ-
ization's control over the player virtually absolute.13
Since its conception, this restrictive rule has been the object of periodic
attacks by disconsolate players. A brief analysis of the effect of the
reserve rule renders apparent the justification for these attacks. First,
a player signing with a professional team signs a uniform contract in
9. HOUSE BASEBALL REPORT 18-22.
10. Id. at 22.
11. Id. at 23-25.
12. Id. at 26-27.
13. Id. at 29-31.
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which he agrees that the club holding the contract will have a unilateral
option to negotiate with him in the future, so that he is bound indef-
initely to bargain with only one team. Secondly, this club retains the
right to assign his contract to another club, which thereby acquires an
exclusive right of dealing with the player. Finally, should the player
breach his contract, he is blacklisted, so that no other professional base-
ball team will bargain with him. In short, the player has two alterna-
tives-play for the team that holds his contract, or retire from profes-
sional baseball.' 4
The attacks launched by players against the reserve rule have gen-
erally been grounded on alleged violations of the Sherman Act. These
grounds appear to be substantively solid, as will be seen below, but the
attacks have failed due to a judicially-created hiatus in the law which
has allowed organized baseball to escape antitrust enforcement.
ORGANIZED BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
In 1922 the Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore brought an action
against the National League for allegedly buying out the constituent
teams in plaintiff's Federal League, and in so doing attempting to mo-
nopolize major league baseball.' 5 In disposing of plaintiff's appeal, the
Supreme Court held that the exhibition and operation of professional
baseball was not the transaction of interstate commerce, and therefore
was not subject to federal regulation under the Sherman Act. 6
The rule in Federal Baseball remained substantially unchallenged until
1949 when in Gardella v. Chandler 7 a player, suspended for a viola-
tion of his reserve clause, questioned the continued validity of the anti-
trust exemption. In departing from the 1922 ruling, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that interstate transmission of
radio and television broadcasts of baseball games, together with new
decisions holding personal services to be the subject of commerce, had
rendered the old exemption rule nugatory.8 Commissioner Chandler
did not appeal this unfavorable decision, and the controversy was settled
14. For an understandably biased although fairly accurate statement of the ramifica-
tions of the reserve rule, see Curt Flood's account of his struggle with the rule-C.
FLoOD, TmE WAY IT Is (1971).
15. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
16. Id. at 209.
17. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
18. Id. at 408.
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out of court, but it appeared for the present that the exemption rule was
dead.
Nevertheless, any hope on the part of the players of securing the
protection of the antitrust laws was extinguished by the Supreme Court
in 1953 in Toolson v. New York Yankees.2 Over the cogent dissent
of Justice Burton,20 the Court reaffirmed per curiam the ruling in Fed-
eral Baseball, basing its decision not on the interstate commerce issue,
but on organized baseball's thirty year development in reliance on
the antitrust exemption.2 1 The Court further intimated that if it was
advisable to abolish the exemption, such result should be effected by
legislative action and not by judicial decision.22 Although various bills
have been introduced in Congress to bring organized baseball under the
purview of the Sherman Actm none have been enacted into law, and the
holding in Toolson remains the law to this day.
THE PRESENT CHALLENGE TO THE SYSTEM
As this note goes to press, another action is pending which seeks to
review the validity of the antitrust exemption. In 1969, outfielder Curt
Flood was traded by the St. Louis National Baseball Club to Philadel-
phia. Flood objected to the trade and appealed to Commissioner Kuhn,
19. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
20. In the light of organized baseball's well-known and widely distributed
capital investments used in conducting competitions between teams con-
standy traveling between states, its receipts and expenditures of large
sums transmitted between states, its numerous purchases of materials in
interstate commerce, the attendance at its local exhibitions of large
audiences often traveling across state lines, its radio and television activities
which expand its audiences beyond state lines, its sponsorship of interstate
advertising, and its highly organized "farm system" of minor league base-
ball clubs, coupled with restrictive contracts and understandings between
individuals and among clubs or leagues playing for profit throughout the
United States, and even in Canada, Mexico and Cuba, it is a contradiction
in terms to say that the defendants in the cases before us are not now
engaged in interstate trade or commerce as those terms are used in the
Constitution of the United States and in the Sherman Act.
Id. at 357-59.
21. Id. at 357.
22. Id.
23. Id. The most recent of these bills was iitroduced in April, 1970 by Senator
Warren G. Magnuson. S. 3725, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). A companion bill was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Brock Adams. H.R.
17078, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The purpose of these bills is to compel baseball to
operate subject to antitrust law and to remove the judicially-created advantage that
baseball has enjoyed over football, basketball, and hockey.
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requesting to be assigned the status of a free agent in order to be able
to bargain with other major league clubs. Kuhn refused, and Flood
thereupon instituted suit against Kuhn and the National League, claim-
hag that the reserve clause is a violation of the Sherman Act to the extent
that it imposes an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce.24 In
the first stage of this controversy, the District Court of the Southern
District of New York denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion against enforcement of the reserve clause because the plaintiff had
not shown sufficient evidence of probable ultimate success necessary to
support a motion for preliminary equitable relief.2 One month there-
after Flood won the second round when the court denied a motion by
defendants to dismiss the complaint, holding that substantial issues of
fact were raised which could not be disposed of without a plenary hear-
ing on the meris.26
The case proceeded to trial, and in July 1970, the court resolved the
issue in favor of the defendants.27 The court reasoned that although
organized baseball was subject to regulation by Congress under the
commerce power, Congress had not seen fit to disturb the 1953 ruling
in Toolson, and therefore that ruling must control.28 Plaintiff filed an
appeal,9 and the issue will apparently eventuate before the Supreme
Court once more. This appeal will involve two questions, the answers
to which may seriously affect the future operation of organized base-
ball. The first question to confront the Court is, should the antitrust
exemption be abolished? The second is, does the reserve rule, as pres-
ently constituted, violate the Sherman Act? If both questions are an-
swered in the affirmative, the implications respecting the continued
stability of professional baseball are critical. What is the probability
of the Court answering both questions in the affirmative, i.e., resolving
the issues in favor of the plaintiff, Flood? To answer this enquiry, it
is necessary to investigate the developments in antitrust law surround-
ing the decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson.
BAsis AND VALImrY OF THE RtLE IN Federal Baseball
The original Supreme Court decision that the operation of organized
24. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. Id. at 805.
26. Flood v. Kuhn, 312 F. Supp. 404, 406-407 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
27. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
28. Id. at 278.
29. Appeal docketed, No. 35424, 2d Cir., July 24, 1970.
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baseball did not constitute interstate commerce30 was based on two
grounds. First, the Court concluded that the exhibition of baseball
games was purely a local affair.31 This result was reached on the author-
ity of Hooper v. Californil in which it was held that the issuance of
an insurance policy to a resident of a different state from that of the
insurance company was not the transaction of interstate commerce, 33
since, in such cases, "the [interstate] transport is a mere incident, not
the essential thing." 34 The second reason for the Court's decision in
Federal Baseball was that the exhibition of baseball games was not trade
or commerce "in the commonly accepted use of these words." 3' The
Court reasoned that "personal effort, not related to production, is not
a subject of commerce," 36 analogizing that a law firm sending an asso-
ciate into another state to argue a case, or a lecture board sending a
lecturer to another state does not thereby engage in interstate com-
merce. 7 For these reasons, the Court decided that the exhibition of
professional baseball games was not the transaction of interstate com-
merce, and therefore was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act.
Since the subsequent decision in Toolson was based in large part on
the doctrine of stare decisis, following Federal Baseball, the continued
viability of the rule in Federal Baseball becomes a relevant subject of
enquiry.
Upon analysis it appears that the reasoning which led to the conclu-
sion that the exhibition of games was purely a state affair is no longer
valid. In 1944, the Supreme Court overruled Hoo per, to the effect that
insurance contracts are no longer considered local in nature, and a busi-
ness that conducts activities across state lines is therefore subject to
regulation by Congress under the commerce clause.38 Furthermore, the
concept of interstate commerce has since been extended to its logical
limit, so that by 1948 any local activity which in any way affected
interstate commerce was considered subject to federal regulation.3 9
30. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
31. Id. at 208.
32. 155 US. 648 (1895).
33. Id. at 655.
34. 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
39. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
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Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the intent of
Congress was to incorporate the full constitutional extent of the com-
merce power into the Sherman Act,40 so that fine distinctions respecting
the degree of interstate commerce affected would seem to be irrelevant.
The second ground for the rule in Federal Baseball has likewise been
eroded by later decisions. Personal services, even though not commer-
cially "productive," may now generally be considered the subject of
commerce.41 It is therefore apparent that the reasoning which induced
the 1922 Court to promulgate the exemption rule has become obsolete.
Despite the fact that the reason for the rule was by this time defunct,
the Supreme Court in 1953 upheld the Federal Baseball decision in Tool-
son v. New York Yankees.42 Without reviewing the material issues of
law, the Court based its decision on two grounds: (1) that the industry
had developed to its present stage on the assumption that it was exempt
from antitrust legislation,4 and (2) that Congress had failed to invali-
date through legislation the 1922 rule and hence was presumed to have
acquiesced in the antitrust exemption.44 Although these may well have
been the practical reasons for the decision, the only legal justification
was a strict application of the doctrine of stare decisis.45
The reasons advanced by the Court in support of the Toolson decision
are not immune from criticism. Regarding the reliance of organized
baseball upon the antitrust exemption, the dissenting opinion aptly points
out that Federal Baseball did not foreclose the possibility of organized
baseball ever becoming interstate commerce, but simply stated that it was
not such in 1922.46 It would be absurd to cohclude that in formulating
a rule of law the Supreme Court thereby contracts with all parties af-
fected that such rule will continue, perpetually immutable, surviving the
changes in the economic and social matrices from which it sprung.
Accord, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
40. E.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
41. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (real
estate brokerage service); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519
(1943) (group health service).
42. 346 US. 356 (1953).
43. Id. at 357.
44. Id.
45. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955).
46. 346 U.S. 356, at 357-58.
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In response to the reasoning advanced in Toolson that the failure of
Congress to enact legislation invalidating Federal Baseball was an indi-
cation of its intent to exempt baseball from antitrust regulation, it is
sufficient to note that in 1952 the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Judiciary Committee expressly denied an intent
to exempt any sport from antitrust control.47 Furthermore, Congress
has specifically exempted certain enumerated activities from control
under the Sherman Act, such as farm cooperatives,48 insurance sales,49
and labor organizations.50 The enumeration by Congress of these spe-
cific exemptions, in conjunction with the fact that the Sherman Act has
been held to encompass the exercise of the full commerce power, 1
would seem to foreclose all argument that Congress intended to exempt
baseball from antitrust regulation. It is illogical in the extreme to argue
that, on the one hand, the Sherman Act is armed with the plenary power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, subject only to Congress's
own enumerated limitations, and on the other, that Congress's apparent
inaction in response to a 1922 judicially-created limitation served to
delimit that plenary power.
It would therefore appear that, as previously stated, the sole legal
basis for the Toolson decision was rigid stare decisis. A decision based
on stare decisis must of course stand or fall on the reasoning underlying
the precedent decision. Where surrounding conditions have so altered
as to render that reasoning no longer valid, blind adherence to the doc-
trine of stare decisis can only lead to a state of legal atrophy. For rea-
sons previously discussed, it is obvious that the rationale which supported
Federal Baseball is no longer tenable. Moreover, developments in anti-
trust law and professional sports since Toolson have rendered the rule
affirmed therein even more archaic.
Posr-Toolson DEVELOP MENTS
Perhaps the most significant judicial determination in the area of
organized athletics since Toolson was the Court's express refusal in
47. In discussing the rejection of four bills introduced in Congress to exempt pro-
fessional sports from the antitrust laws, the subcommittee observed, "Such a broad
exemption could not be granted without substantially repealing the antitrust laws."
HousE BASEBALL REPoRT 230.
48. Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388-89, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1964).
49. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Star. 34, 61 Star. 448, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1964).
50. Clayton Act § 6, 38 Star. 731, 15 US.C. § 17 (1964).
51. Note 40 supra.
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Radovicb v. National Football League5 2 to extend the antitrust exemp-
tion beyond the sphere of professional baseball. This decision carved
away any remaining vestigial bases of Federal Baseball and Toolson, and
left the baseball exemption rule a conspicuous anomaly. 53 Recognizing
this effect, the Radovich Court reiterated the opinion that the appro-
priate means of eliminating the inconsistency was through legislation . 4
The anomaly has since been thrown into sharp relief by the routine
application of the antitrust laws to such other professional sports asbasketball, 55 bowling,a6 boxing, and golf,"' and the continued refusal
to reevaluate the status of baseball. 59
The commercial plexus of organized baseball has been vastly extended
since the Toolson decision. Eight new clubs have joined the major
leagues, the franchise structure has been projected to the West Coast,
farm systems have been increasingly integrated into the organization,
intercontinental telecasting has greatly increased television receipts.
These developments, together with the 1965 incorporation of a major
league draft agreement (the restrictive effect of which will be discussed
below) would seem to beg a reappraisal of Toolson and the unique
position which organized baseball consequently continues to enjoy. An
opportunity for such a reappraisal will presumably be afforded by
Flood's pending appeal.
52. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
53. Dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
It does not derive from the Sherman Law because the most conscientious
probing of the text and the interstices of the Sherman Law fails to disclose
that Congress, whose will we are enforcing, excluded baseball-the conditions
under which that sport is carried on-from the scope of the Sherman Law
but included football.
Id. at 455.
54. If this ruling is unrealistic
, 
inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to
answer . . . that were we considering the question of baseball for the
first time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts. But Federal Base-
ball held the business of baseball outside the scope of the Act. No other
business claiming the coverage of those cases has such an adjudication.
We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrim-
ination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision.
Id. at 452.
55. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
56. Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d
371 (9th Cir. 1966).
57. United States v. International Boxing Club, 349 U.S. 236 (1955).
58. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
59. E.g., Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003
(2d Cir. 1970).
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LEGALITY OF TiE RESERVE RULE
If the Supreme Court decides to overrule Toolson and thus to abro-
gate the antitrust exemption, the second issue to be decided is whether
the reserve rule as it now exists is illegal under the Sherman Act. The
contention of Flood and previous litigants is that the reserve rule im-
poses an unreasonable restraint on commerce to the extent that it impedes
the bargaining ability of the players. As a result of the exemption rule,
the courts have never grappled with this question,"° so that discussion
of the issue can be based only on analogy to similar antitrust problems.
A strict interpretation of section one of the Sherman Act would seem
to indicate that, aside from an exception allowing vertical agreements
fixing the price of fair-traded items,"1 all agreements in restraint of trade
are illegal, and the early antitrust cases so held. 2 In 1911, the Supreme
Court ruled in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States'3 that
the Sherman Act proscribed only unreasonable restraints of trade.
Standard Oil formulated the "rule of reason" test which governs the
majority of antitrust decisions to this day.6" Simply stated, the thrust
of the rule of reason approach is that the courts will consider the effect
of the agreement upon the entire industry in question in light of prevail-
ing conditions, and if found unduly restrictive, or if the dominant pur-
pose of the agreement is the restraint of trade, the agreement will be held
violative of the Sherman Act. Conversely, if the industry can demon-
strate an overriding justification for the restrictive agreement in rule
of reason cases, such agreement will generally be held legal. In short,
the legality of agreements in this type of situation is determined on a
case-by-case basis.
Some activities have been determined to be so clearly contrary to
public policy as to be held illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Ex-
amples of such activities are horizontal price-fixing agreements,65 divi-
60. The only case since Federal Baseball in which the court refused to recognize the
exemption was Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). However, as this
controversy was eventually settled out of court, the merits of the reserve system were
never considered by the court.
61. This proviso was added to section 1 by Act of Aug. 17, 1937. ch. 690, tit. VIII,
50 Stat. 693 (1937). See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
62. Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, 152 F. 864 (3rd Cir.
1907).
63. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
64. E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
65. L.e., price-fixing agreements between parties within the same competitive level,
such as retail merchants. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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sion of markets, 0 tying arrangements,17 and secondary boycotts."e The
per se rule, where applicable, renders immaterial such considerations as
degree of market dominance and commercial necessities, and thus ob-
viates the need for inquiry into the nature and historical development
of the industry in question.
It is uncertain whether the rule of reason or the per se rule will
govern the reserve agreement. There is some argument that the reserve
rule engenders a form of secondary boycott, in that major league players
are coerced by the rule to boycott rival leagues.09 If a secondary boy-
cott is found to be the effect of the rule, it probably will be held ille-
gal on the authority of Kors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,07
which determined that secondary boycotts were per se illegal. Such a
finding by the Court would render futile any argument that the reserve
system is a necessary component of the operation of organized baseball.
An exception to the per se rule was created in Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange71 to the effect that a concerted refusal to deal may be
exempted from the per se category by "justification derived from the
policy of another statute or otherwise." 72 In Silver, however, the Court
found that the Security Exchange Act encouraged self-regulation. 73 As
baseball does not have the benefit of such a statute, it is unlikely that
the Silver exception will be applied.
Another line of reasoning which may place the reserve rule in the
per se category stems from its promotion of price manipulation. It was
held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.74 that agreements tend-
ing to fix prices between parties in the same level of competition were
illegal per se. Although Socony and its progeny 5 involved prices of
66. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
67. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
68. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). A secondary
boycott consists of the application of coercive pressure upon a third party to refrain
from dealing with a competitor of the party applying the pressure. See Anderson,
The Sherman Act and Professional Sports Associations' Use of Eligibility Rules, 47
NEB. L. REv. 82 (1968).
- 69. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 68.
70. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
71. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See also Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act:
Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HAxv. L. REv. 418 (1967) for an
argument that the Silver exception should apply to professional sports.
72. Id. at 348-49.
73. Id. at 349.
74. 310 US. 150 (1940).
75. E.g., Kieffer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1950); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241 (1941).
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goods rather than personal services, there'seems to be no logical reason
for refusal to extrapolate the rule to cases involving prices of personal
service.
If the Court decides that the reserve rule should not be classified as ille-
gal per se, the next question presented is whether the rule creates an un-
reasonable restraint of trade. The arguments advanced by organized base-
ball concerning the necessity of the reserve agreement are substantially
the same reasons that gave rise to its adoption in 1879-that such an
agreement is vital to promote even competition on the playing field,
and to preserve team stability.76 The issue with which the Court will
be confronted is whether in light of these considerations the reserve rule
is unduly restrictive.
The reserve clause is incorporated into a uniform player's contract
which is used by all major league clubs. 77 This contract, standard in
all material terms except salary, is imposed on the players by virtue of
a "basic agreement" between the major league clubs, acting in concert
as the National and American Leagues, and the Major League Baseball
Players Association.78 That the contract is purportedly a product of
collective bargaining between the opposing interest groups would on
first impression appear to favor a finding of reasonableness. Nonetheless,
even aside from considerations of the relative bargaining positions of the
parties, in the area of antitrust, agreements reached by collective bargain-
ing and arbitration are not ipso facto reasonable. In Paramount Famous
76. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275 (1970).
77. Uniform Player's Contract, National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
10 in CouNsELING PaomssioNAL ATimms .aND ENTERTAems 424, 428 (1970) (Prac-
tising Law Institute, Tax Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 17). The
pertinent portion reads as follows:
10. (a) On or before January 15 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding
business day) of the year next following the last playing season covered
by this contract, the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term
of that year by mailing the same to the Player at his address following his
signature hereto . ... If prior to March 1 next succeeding said January
15, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of such
contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have
the right by written notice to the Player at said address to renew this
contract for the period of one year on the same terms, except that the
amount payable to the Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said
notice, provided, that said amount, if fixed by a Major League Club, shall
be an amount payable at a rate not less than 75% of the rate stipulated
for the preceding year.
78. Basic Agreement of 19 February 1968 in CoUNsEmNG PROF-ssIONAL Amxzrrs,
supra note 77, at 418.
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Lasky Corp. v. United States9 the Supreme Court ruled that an agree-
ment effecting a concerted refusal to deal except by a standard form
contract containing unreasonably restrictive terms constituted an un-
reasonable restraint of trade notwithstanding the fact that the agreement
was reached only after six years of bargaining and discussion.,0 Since
the baseball "basic agreement" promotes a concerted refusal to deal
except by standard contract, it follows that the authority of Paramount
Famous should render immaterial the proposition that the reserve clause
was collectively bargained for. The reasonableness of the clause should
be determined solely in light of its restrictive effect on the player's bar-
gaining ability and its justification, if any.
The restrictive effect of the reserve clause was intensified in 1965
when the major leagues adopted a player draft rule providing for a draft
of new players every six months.&8 1 By this new rule if a draftee fails
to reach an agreement with the drafting club, he cannot bargain with
other clubs but must await a period of six months until the next draft. 2
Since few prospective players are willing to remain idle for six months
at the risk of later being drafted by a club that may offer no better
terms, the draft rule, taken in conjunction with the reserve clause, has
the practical effect of foreclosing the player from ever bargaining with
more than one club at a time.
Nor do the minor league clubs offer a practical bargaining alternative,
as the great majority of these clubs are tied through integration agree-
ments, known as "farm systems," to the major league clubs. Conse-
quently the minor league farm teams use the same uniform contract as
the major league parent clubs, with the same reserve clause. The result
is that these minor league clubs cannot bargain with a player who is
reserved by another club.
Once under a reserve agreement, if a player fails to arrive at terms
with the reserving club for the following year, the club is allowed to
set the player's salary for that year, limited to a minimum of seventy-
79. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
80. The Court observed that "[ilt may be that arbitration is well adapted to the
needs of the motion picture industry; but when under the guise of arbitration parties
enter into unusual arrangements which unreasonably suppress normal competition their
action becomes illegal." Id. at 43.
81. Major League Rules 4(h)-(j), 1966 BLuE BooK 519-22.
82. The repressive effect of the draft rule is tempered somewhat by the provision
that a team which has drafted a player and failed to reach an agreement with him
cannot redraft that player in the succeeding draft. Major League Rule 4(1), 1966
BLUE BooK 523.
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five per cent of his current salary.83 If the player refuses to play for
this club he is "blacklisted" by mutual agreement between the leagues.
No club in organized baseball will deal with a blacklisted player for
fear of league reprisals."4 Blacklisting by a professional sports organi-
zation is not in itself illegal, and has been upheld by the courts when
used to protect the legitimate interests of the organization.8 5 It is doubt-
ful, however, that organized baseball could establish a legitimate interest
in blacklisting a player simply because he refused to accept an offer to
play for another year at a twenty-five per cent reduction in salary.8 6
In fact, blacklisting a player for such reason arguably amounts to price
manipulation within a competitive level, a practice which, as noted
above, is held to be illegal per se.s7
The reserve rule and its attendant means of enforcement, the black-
list, combine to restrict-in fact to negate-free trade among the players
and clubs. The sweeping effect of the restraint, absent a compelling
reason for its existence, appears to render the reserve agreement unduly
restrictive and therefore illegal when measured against the rule of reason
test.
Any arguments submitted by organized baseball that there is a com-
pelling justification for such a restrictive rule, such as those propounded
by the defendants in Flood,ss can be countered by analogy to other
organized team sports. Football and basketball, for example, not having
had the benefit of the antitrust exemption, have devised less restrictive
means of player control.19 There is no evidence that the exigencies of
professional baseball justify harsher controls, nor have the less stringent
methods employed by the other team sports fostered anarchy among the
players.
In summation, it appears that but for the antitrust exemption the
83. Note 77 supra.
84. See generally Comment, supra note 8.
85. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), wherein
the court held that league blacklisting of a player for violation of a league anti-gambling
rule was not violative of the Sherman Act.
86. In the hands of unscrupulous team management, the implications of this seventy-
five per cent forced renewal agreement are. suprisingly far-reaching. For example, a
player who originally contracts for a $24,000 salary could find his salary "renewed
down" to about $7500 by his fifth season, should the club choose to force him to
the allowable seventy-five per cent salary each year.
87. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US. 150 (1940).
88. 316 F. Supp. 271, 275 (1970).
89. See notes 90, 91 infra.
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reserve rule is violative of the Sherman Act whether viewed through
the per se doctrine or the rule of reason test.
ALTERNATIVE PLAYER CONTROLS
Even if Flood were to fail in his effort to persuade the Supreme Court
to overrule Toolson, it appears certain that the exemption will be abol-
ished, either judicially or through legislation, in the near future. Such
a glaring and foundless anomaly in the law will not be allowed to sur-
vive indefinitely. It is therefore timely to consider possible alternative
controls which could be adopted by organized baseball to achieve the
same beneficial result as the reserve rule, yet which would not be so
restrictive as to violate the Sherman Act. Legitimate objectives to be
pursued are the preservation of team stability and continuity, and the
balancing of strength among the clubs. Depression of salaries, as men-
tioned above, is not a legitimate objective, because any agreement with
a view toward depressing salaries has the restraint of trade as its dom-
inant purpose.
Since the other team sports which are not presently exempt from
antitrust enforcement have player control problems similar to those
faced by organized baseball, it is appropriate to begin with an examina-
tion of their solutions. It must be observed at the outset, however, that
these controls have not been reviewed by the Supreme Court, so their
legality cannot be conclusively presumed.
Professional footbal 90 and basketball91 employ an "option clause,"
which on its face is not as restrictive as the reserve rule. Essentially, the
contract term is one year, with the club retaining the option to renew
unilaterally for a second year at a minimum of ninety per cent of cur-
rent salary if the parties fail to reach a new agreement. If the club
exercises its option, the second term contract contains no option clause
and the player is free of all restraints by the club after the contract's
expiration. In the case of football, however, this freedom is to a great
extent illusory, since in the event a club acquires a player who has
played out his option, the Commissioner of Professional Football is
90. Standard Player Contract for Major Professional Football Operations as Con-
ducted by the National Football League and the American Football League, 10 in
COUNSELING PROFESSIONAL ATHIEmTs, supra note 77, at 377, 381; Canadian Football
League, Standard Player's Contract, 15 in COrSELI PROFESSIONAL ATHmTEs, supra
note 77, at 369, 377.
91. American Basketball Association, Uniform Player Contract, 15 in COUNSELING
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES, supra note 77, at 390, 396.
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empowered to assign the contract of a player on the acquiring team to
the club which lost the player."2 As it is impossible to ascertain which
player will be assigned, the fear of an unfavorable "forced trade" oper-
ates to discourage clubs from bargaining with "renegade" players. The
legality of this discretionary assignment provision is questionable be-
cause, arguably, the effect is to promote a secondary boycott, viz., to
coerce the clubs to boycott players who have played out their options.9 3
Absent this provision, the option for a term of years seems to be a
reasonable alternative for organized baseball. The option could be ex-
tended to two years, and made assignable to permit trades. As part of
the bargained-for exchange, the option would be supported by consid-
eration, and given the unique nature of athletic service agreements,
injunctive relief would be available to prevent a player who has breached
his contract from playing for another club.94
A provision of this nature does not appear to be unduly restrictive,
as the player would have a real opportunity to bargain for salary
increases during the option's expiration year. Continuity and stability
would be preserved by virtue of the overlapping terms during which the
various players were under option agreement with the club, and as a
practical matter, a player would incur ties in the club city which would
tend to bind him to the club, so long as he was offered a fair salary.
Professional hockey has developed an unusual method of player con-
trol. The uniform player contract9 5 binds the parties for one year, but
it contains a clause by which the player agrees to enter into another
contract, identical but for salary, for the succeeding year. The salary
term for the second year is left open, with the provision that if the
parties fail to agree on salary the matter will be submitted to the Presi-
dent of the National Hockey League, whose decision will be accepted
as final. The effect is a perpetual agreement to contract, with a provi-
sion for salary arbitration. Although the arbitration provision is cer-
tainly more reasonable than the twenty-five per cent maximum salary
cut provided in the reserve clause, the indefinite duration of control
would probably render the hockey contract unduly restrictive.
92. Professional Football Const. and By-Laws, art. XII, § 12.1 (H) (1968).
93. See Anderson, supra note 68; Comment, The Sherman Act: Football's Player
Controls-Are They Reasonable?, 6 CAL. Wasr. L. REv. 133 (1969).
94. See generally Brennan, Injunction against Professional Athletes Breaching their
Contracts, 34 BROOKLYN L. REv. 61 (1967); Comment, Enforcement Problems of Per-
sonal Service Contracts in Professional Athletics, 6 T SA L. J. 40 (1969).
95. National Hockey League, Standard Player's Contract, 17 in COUNSELING IRo-
FESSIONAL ATaHLEs, supra note 77, at 384, 388. .
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Another possible alternative, suggested by the Players Association,
consists of allowing the player free agency status after a three-year term,
with a right of first refusal retained by the original club, which would
presumably have the option to match any offer tendered by another
club and thereby retain the player.96 Although this proposal was ini-
tially rejected by the clubs,97 there is no reason to suspect that it would
have a deleterious effect on the stability of the sport. Moreover, by
allowing a periodic interval in which players could bargain with other
clubs, it would counter the salary-depressing tendency of the present
reserve rule.
Still another means of control which could be implemented is the
adoption of a contract for a definite term of years with a provision for
annual salary arbitration after the first year. In this way, if the player
improved dramatically and could therefore justifiably demand a higher
salary, such salary could be set by an objective tribunal should the
parties fail to arrive at terms. Conversely, if the ability of the player
suffered a marked decline, the tribunal could determine a proper
diminution of salary or the parties could negotiate a release allowing
the player to bargain in the free market. A five-year uniform contract
should be both reasonable and of sufficient duration to preserve con-
tinuity among the clubs.
Of course these proposals do not comprise a definitive catalogue of
possible alternative means of player control,98 but merely serve to illus-
trate the plethora of available methods by which organized baseball
could legally accomplish its legitimate objectives should the antitrust
exemption be abolished.
CONCLUSION
For nearly five decades the business of organized baseball has flour-
ished under the shelter of a 1922 decision exempting the industry from
federal antitrust regulation. Consequently the baseball industry has been
allowed to develop certain operating procedures, such as the controver-
sial reserve system, which but for the exemptio*n are of dubious legality.
The reserve system sprung from a period in which the bare survival
of the sport necessitated a stringent player control device. In modern
timies, however, the presence of other professional team sports which
96. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 283 n.18 (1970).
97. Id. at 283.
98. Several additional proposals were submitted by Flood. See id. at 275 n.12.
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thrive without resort to such restrictive control indicates that the reserve
system is no longer a categorical necessity. Furthermore, subsequent
economic developments in the area of organized baseball, together with
judicial expansion of federal antitrust jurisdiction, demand a review of
the viability of the exemption. The pending appeal of outfielder Curt
Flood should present the opportunity for such a review.
Although the merits seem to favor an overruling of the exemption
decisions, such an outcome, at the cost of destroying the economic and
athletic stability of organized baseball, from which Flood and thousands
of other players derive their sustenance, would indeed represent a Pyr-
rhic victory. Accordingly, several alternative methods have been sug-
gested by which organized baseball could accomplish its legitimate ob-
jectives of athletic balance and team stability and still meet the standards
imposed by the Sherman Act. There is no reason to believe that the
justifiable demands of club and player are irreconcilable. Hopefully, the
final disposition of Flood v. Kuhn will afford an opportunity for a
compromise agreement wherein the legitimate interests of the player
as well as the industry are protected.
Ricir.mu B. BLACKwELL
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